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ABSTRACT
A/B testing is one of the most successful applications of
statistical theory in modern Internet age. One problem of
Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing (NHST), the backbone
of A/B testing methodology, is that experimenters are not
allowed to continuously monitor the result and make de-
cision in real time. Many people see this restriction as
a setback against the trend in the technology toward real
time data analytics. Recently, Bayesian Hypothesis Test-
ing, which intuitively is more suitable for real time deci-
sion making, attracted growing interest as an alternative to
NHST. While corrections of NHST for the continuous mon-
itoring setting are well established in the existing literature
and known in A/B testing community, the debate over the
issue of whether continuous monitoring is a proper practice
in Bayesian testing exists among both academic researchers
and general practitioners. In this paper, we formally prove
the validity of Bayesian testing with continuous monitoring
when proper stopping rules are used, and illustrate the the-
oretical results with concrete simulation illustrations. We
point out common bad practices where stopping rules are
not proper and also compare our methodology to NHST
corrections. General guidelines for researchers and practi-
tioners are also provided.
Category and Subject Descriptors: G.3 [Probability
and Statistics]: Statistical Computing
Keywords: A/B testing, controlled experiments, Bayesian
statistics, optional stopping, continuous monitoring
1. INTRODUCTION
Many online service companies nowadays have been using
online controlled experiments, a.k.a. A/B Testing, as a sci-
entifically grounded way to evaluate changes and comparing
different alternatives. A/B testing plays a leading role in
establishing the mantra of data driven decision making, and
is one of the basic pillars in Data Science.
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Most of A/B tests are conducted using the statistical the-
ory of frequentist null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST),
namely t-test or z-test. 1 Experimenters using NHST sum-
marize the test result in a p-value and reject the null hypoth-
esis H0 when the p-value is less than a prescribed confidence
level α. The interpretation is that assuming all model as-
sumptions are correct, doing so we can control the Type-I
error, i.e. the probability of making a false rejection when
H0 is true, to be no greater than α.
Recently, interests in using Bayesian model comparison
for two sample hypothesis testing are growing [8; 22; 14].
The type of statistical interpretations we make from Bayes-
ian tests is fundamentally different from NHST. Under the
Bayesian framework, we assume there is a prior probabil-
ity P (H1) for H1 (the alternative) to be true, and similarly
P (H0) for H0 to be true. The ratio between the two is called
the prior odds. After collecting data from an experiment,
we update prior odds using the Bayes Rule:
P (H1|Data)
P (H0|Data) =
P (H1)
P (H0)
× P (Data|H1)
P (Data|H0) , (1)
which is commonly referred as
Posterior Odds = Prior Odds× Bayes Factor.
Note that the Bayes Factor(BF) is the likelihood ratio of
observing the data between H1 and H0. From the posterior
odds, it is straightforward to calculate the posterior proba-
bilities P (H1|Data) and P (H0|Data). The test result can
be interpreted as follows. Conditioning on a posterior odds
K, rejecting H1 will expose us to a risk of a false rejec-
tion/discovery with probability P (H0|Data) = 1/(K + 1).
In this paper we are interested in a common practice called
continuous monitoring or optional stopping. This practice
is best described as the following Example.
Example 1 (Optional Stopping).
We observe data sequentially through time and at any time
we can conduct statistical analysis on the data already ob-
served. Let t = 1, . . . , N be all the interim check points that
we can take a peek at our A/B test results2. For any given
metric M, let Rt be its test result at check-point t. We define
1For this paper, we assume readers are already familiar with
the concepts of null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST)
in controlled experiments. Readers new to these concepts
should refer to references such as Kohavi et al. [16].
2A test result could be something like test statistics, p-value
or Bayes Factor/posterior. We use this vague notion when
the detail is not important.
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an event St that is observed at time t and stop the experi-
ment at the first t such that the event happens (Rt ∈ St)
and return result Rt, e.g. when we deem the result is “sig-
nificant” or “conclusive”. Typically event St is defined as
p-value < α or P (H0|Data) < r. If this event didn’t happen
at t = N we return test result RN . In fact we don’t even
need to collect data after that. A general version could have
infinite horizon.
Pitfalls of continuous monitoring under NHST framework
have been documented in various publications. We say the
interpretation of the result is unbiased with continuous mon-
itoring if the validity of the interpretation holds regardless
of whether continuous monitoring is used. NHST is valid for
fixed horizon test. But it is known to underestimate Type-I
error when continuous monitoring is used. To quickly see
why, if experimenters are allowed to stop the first time p-
value is less than 5%, we will only reject more often, but no
less comparing to a fixed horizon design, because the event
of rejection in a fixed horizon design, i.e. only reject at time
N , is strictly a subset of the event of rejection in the contin-
uously monitoring design. As a result, if the Type-I error in
the fixed horizon design is 5%, the Type-I error with contin-
uous monitoring will in general exceed 5%. An application
of the law of iterated logarithm shows when incoming data
are i.i.d. continuous monitoring will inflate Type-I error to
100% when the horizon N goes to infinity, see Siegmund [24]
and Section 6. Johari et al. [12] provided simulation results
showing that the inflation of Type-I error is significant and
could be typically above 50% or more.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Xt be all the observed data up to time
t and BFt be the Bayes Factor defined as
P (Xt|H1)
P (Xt|H0) and pos-
terior odds PostOddst defined as in (1) with known prior
odds P (H1)/P (H0). Let τ be any stopping time defined by a
proper stopping rule, i.e. a mechanism for deciding whether
to continue or stop on the basis of only the present and past
events and τ is finite almost surely. Then the interpretation
of the Bayes Factor and posterior odds remains unbiased
with optional stopping at τ . Specifically, we have
P (H1|PostOddsτ )
P (H0|PostOddsτ ) = PostOddsτ . (2)
Theorem 1 says that even though posterior odds is calcu-
late at a random stopping time τ , conditioning on observing
a posterior odds of K, rejecting H1 will expose us to a risk of
a false rejection/discovery probability of 1/(K + 1). This is
a nontrivial result, because BFτ and PostOddsτ are calcu-
lated as if τ is a fixed time t. Theorem 1 guarantees that the
Bayesian test result remains the same interpretation even
with continuous monitoring, provided that the Bayes Fac-
tor (and hence the posterior odds) are calculated using all
available observations up to the stopping time τ , and the
stopping rule is properly defined to be based on only the
present and past events. In particular, the theorem does
not hold if Bayes Factor is calculated on a selected subset of
the observations available at time t, or if the stopping rule
peeked ahead into the future. These requirements are met in
all common practices of continuous monitoring as in Exam-
ple 1 where the stopping time is called a “hitting time”. In
conclusion, Theorem 1 formally endorsed the practice of con-
tinuous monitoring in the framework of Bayesian Hypothesis
Testing. This is in stark contrast to NHST, where special
adjustment has to be done. Still, practices like “re-analyze
the same data using continuous monitoring after failed to
reject using all data” is not supported by Theorem 1. More
bad practices are discussed later in Section 5.
At the time of writing, there is still a lack of general agree-
ment on whether continuous monitoring is a proper practice
when Bayes test is used, more details in Section 2. The
purpose of this paper is to provide arguments assessable by
practitioners and engineers, while at the same time provide
rigorous proofs for researchers in A/B testing community as
well as related fields. With this main goal, the contributions
of this paper are
1. We formally prove Theorem 1 in Section 4.
2. We also adopt a simulation based approach to help
understand Bayes Factor and posterior odds in a more
tangible way, which we believe is more effective for
both researchers and practitioners to understand the
result and gain intuitions.
3. We discuss practical implications of using Bayesian
Hypothesis Testing by comparing it to NHST. We also
review and compare to NHST adjustment of continu-
ous monitoring as in Johari et al. [12].
4. For practitioners, we make recommendations on when
and when not to use continuous monitoring. We em-
phasize cases Theorem 1 does not apply.
All model assumptions required in our models are taken as
granted. Although both NHST and Bayesian tests make ex-
tra model assumptions, the latter requires more such as prior
and distribution under H1. In practice many people use
subjective priors or so called non-informative priors. These
practices have been criticized a lot since there are no agree-
ment among researchers and practitioners on which prior is
appropriate. However, with the existence of rich historical
A/B tests data, Deng [8] showed that we can learn prior
objectively from the empirical data. The only assumption
we are making when using historical tests data is that we
assume the prior behind those historical A/B tests are the
same as the current A/B test. See Johnstone and Silverman
[13] for a similar technique applied in signal processing. We
will provide the algorithm in Appendix B. But the general
discussion of objective prior learning is a purely orthogonal
topic to this paper and therefore out of our scope.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We review
related work in the next Section. Section 3 illustrates The-
orem 1 using simulation studies. Proof of the main theorem
is in Section 4, with intuitive explanations. We emphasize
bad practices where Theorem 1 does not apply in Section 5.
Section 6 discuss practical implications of using Bayesian
Test vs. NHST. We also review and compare to “always
valid inference” in Johari et al. [12]. Section 7 concludes the
paper with practical recommendations.
2. RELATEDWORK
The need of a different theory to allow continuous moni-
toring in NHST framework has long been known as the sub-
ject of sequential hypothesis testing, which dates back to
1945 [25]. Sequential hypothesis testing and later on group
sequential testing have been widely used in Clinical Trials,
see [1] for a recent survey of the area. The idea of sequential
test is only been recently popularized by Johari et al. [12] in
A/B testing community, by including it as part of the offer-
ing of the commercial A/B testing platform Optimizely. De-
spite it being newly introduced to A/B testing community,
the theories behind sequential tests under NHST frameworks
are well known by statisticians and practitioners in related
areas such as clinical trials, psychology, econometrics and
other social sciences. There is little dispute about the valid-
ity of the methodology.
Bayesian hypothesis testing, on the other hand, is much
less accepted and established than its frequentist counter-
part. This was largely due to the need of prior knowledge
that commonly requires a subjective choice or so called“non-
informative” priors which also lack of justification. However,
as argued in Deng [8], for A/B testing in the big data era,
much of the issue in choosing prior can be mitigated by
using historical A/B tests data to empirically learn prior,
assuming we have no evidence that the current experiment
will have difference chance of success than the past. Putting
the issue of choosing a prior aside, many Bayesians have ar-
gued that Bayesian reasoning should be immune to stopping
rule. For example, Dawid [6] brought up the notion of con-
ditional independence and argued that posterior based on
stopping time shouldn’t alter likelihood ratios. This issue is
also discussed in Berger and Berry [4] and later Berger and
Bayarri [3] referred to the idea as the “stopping rule princi-
ple” and said “once the data have been obtained, the reasons
for stopping experimentation should have no bearing on the
evidence reported about unknown model parameters.” Al-
though the idea is well received by leading Bayesians, there
are still a lot of debates going on among researchers and
practitioners (who cares more about practical applications
instead of entrenched debate between Bayesian and frequen-
tist) on whether Bayesian testing and more generally Bay-
esian analysis is adjustment-free when optional stopping is
applied. John K. Kruschke, a professor of psychological sci-
ence, author of the well received book Doing Bayesian Anal-
ysis [17], made the point that Bayesian testing can be bi-
ased under optional stopping in 2013 [18]. Andrew Gelman,
a professor of statistics and political science, is on the other
side and claimed that optional stopping is Kosher in Bayes-
ian analysis in 2014 [11]. This debate is also still heated in
Psychon. Bull. Rev., a journal where Bayesian hypothesis
testing is relatively well received. In a 2014 paper Rouder
[21] used simulation to support the case of Bayesian test
with optional stopping, and to counter criticisms from Erica
et al. [10] and Sanborn and Hills [23], both published also in
2014.
We believe the lack of a general agreement on this issue
even in mid 2010s is a clear sign that this is still a big prob-
lem for researchers and practitioners in various areas. This
is especially the case for A/B testing community because
1) data are always received in near real time in a sequen-
tial fashion, 2) the technology enables and even encourages
experimenters to frequently check out the test results. We
found the simulation argument made in Rouder [21] to be
insightful and easier to understand by practitioners and en-
gineers than mathematical formulas. We adopt the same
approach and also formally provide rigorous proof of Theo-
rem 1 in Section 4.
3. SIMULATION ILLUSTRATION
Instead of explaining and proving Theorem 1 right away,
we present some simulation results first. This section serves
two purposes. First, a big part of the debates about whether
Bayesian test is biased with continuous monitoring is due to
wrong interpretations of the Bayesian test result itself, and
using frequentist measurements such as Type-I error to eval-
uate a Bayesian test result. This is largely due to most re-
searchers, especially statisticians, are trained with frequen-
tist statistics and methodologies. A correct interpretation of
Bayesian posterior odds and Bayes Factor is a prerequisite
for readers to understand and appreciate Theorem 1 and rest
of the paper. To this end, for most data scientists and engi-
neers, we found replicable simulation results is more tangible
and concrete than probability formulas. Secondly, through
the simulation results, we hope readers will glimpse some
intuitions on why Theorem 1 is indeed expected. Readers
who are not interested in rigorous proof can even skip the
formal proof in the next section.
Important: Recall
Posterior Odds = Prior Odds× Bayes Factor.
Prior odds is considered known and is independent of the
observations collected for the test. Prior odds is easy to
interpret and interpretation of Bayes Factor, hence the pos-
terior odds is the essence of a Bayesian test. Without loss of
generality, from now on we will assume a prior odds of 1:1,
i.e. H1 and H0 are equally likely based on our belief without
seeing any data. In this case Posterior Odds and Bayes Fac-
tor are the same. Readers can treat them as interchangeable
in this paper.
3.1 Bayes Factor and Fixed Horizon Test
To correctly understand the meaning of Bayes Factor, we
first look at the vanilla case — a fixed horizon test first. In a
fixed horizon test experimenters prescribe the total sample
size, or equivalently, length and traffic of the A/B test first
and only consider the test result when we collected all the
data as the final result.
We consider a simple problem of testing a normal mean.
We observe N i.i.d. observations Xi, i = 1, . . . , N from a
normal distribution N(µ, 1) with unknown mean µ. µ = 0
under the null hypothesis H0, and µ = δ under the alter-
native hypothesis H1. Equivalently, sample mean X is the
sufficient statistics and it has distribution N(0, 1/N) under
H0 and N(δ, 1/N) under H1. Note that this is even simpler
than a A/B test because there is only one group. For two
sample A/B test we replace X by ∆ = XT −XC , e.g. dif-
ference of two sample means, and the test is essentially the
same as one sample test. See Appendix A.
The Bayes Factor is
P (X|H1)
P (X|H0)
=
exp(−(X − δ)2/(2/N))
exp(−(X)2/(2/N)) = exp
(
N
2
δ(2X − δ)
)
(3)
Conditioning on observing a X, if we plug it into Equa-
tion 3 and get a number K, what does it mean? To illustrate
this, we simulate 100, 000 runs and each run we simulate
N = 100 observations Xi, i = 1, . . . , N . Since we assume
prior odds 1:1, we simulate 50, 000 runs under H1, where
Xi ∼ N(δ, 1) and the other 50, 000 runs under H0 where
Xi ∼ N(0, 1). At the end of each run, we calculate Bayes
Factor based on Equation 3. The end result of this simula-
tion is 100, 000 Bayes Factors, half of them are from H1 and
half of them from H0.
We did this simulation for δ = 0.2 and N = 100. Fig-
ure 1 shows histograms of those Bayes Factors in log scale,
grouped by the ground truth models H0 and H1. Bayes Fac-
tors from H1 are shown on top and those from H0 are shown
Figure 1: Histograms of Bayes Factor simulated
from both models. For each bin, the number on
top are the ratio of simulated Bayes Factors from
alternative to those from null.
at the bottom. What does it mean if we observe a Bayes
Factor of 2.1? On Figure 1, we first group Bayes Factors
close to 2.1 together in to the same bin. There are about
4, 000 runs from H1 (height of the red bar) that produced a
Bayes Factor close to 2.1 (among 50, 000 simulation runs),
while around 2, 000 (height of the blue bar) are from H0
(among 50, 000 simulation runs). The actual ratio of those
from H1 to H0 is shown on top of the plot and is 2.1, which
is the same as the Bayes Factor 2.1 we started with. In fact,
if you go through each bin carefully in Figure 1, you will
find the number on the x-axis, which represents Bayes Fac-
tor value calculated from Equation 3 and grouped into each
bin, are very close to the actual observed count ratio of those
from H1 (top red) to those from H0(bottom green), except
those at the far tail on both sides. Is this a coincidence? Of
course not. When observed a Bayes Factor of K, we know
both model H0 and H1 could result in such a Bayes Factor.
This simulation we did let us replay the data generation pro-
cess and observe how likely it is for H1 to generate such a
Bayes Factor and how likely for H0 respectively, which are
represented, after binning similar Bayes Factors together,
by the height of the top and bottom histograms. Our inter-
est is the odds of this Bayes Factor being from H1 to H0,
which is the ratio of heights between the red bar and the
green bar. We will expect the observed ratio to be close to
the true underlying odds, within some small expected error
due to 1) simulation randomness and 2) discretization used
in binning similar Bayes Factor together. The error from
simulation randomness is smaller for those center bins, i.e.
bins where more Bayes Factors are observed from 100, 000
simulation runs, and are larger for those at the tails3. What
we observed so far can be summarized as:
True underlying odds = Observed ratio
= Bayes Factor calculated from Equation 3.
This simulation illustrated two things
1. Bayes Factor can be conceptually “materialized” as the
ratio of the bar heights from the H1 histogram and H0
3Some bins on the two tails are either showing an observed
ratio of 0 or Inf, for the obvious reason.
histogram. An observed Bayes Factor of K means it
is K times more likely to be generated from H1 than
H0.
2. For the fixed horizon case, Equation 3 is the same as
the true odds (at least they must be very close).
The fact that Equation 3 is the correct Bayes Factor is no
news at all. We just followed the definition of Bayes Factor,
and the observation so far confirms that we didn’t make any
mistake in Equation 3. In other words, without continuous
monitoring, a fixed horizon Bayesian test of H1 vs. H0 as in
this section using Equation 3 provides the true underlying
odds we can use to make decision. This is a special case of
Theorem 1 where the stopping rule is to only stop at N , and
(2) says if we calculate posterior odds which is just Bayes
Factor here using P (XN |H1)/P (XN |H0), it is the same as
the true underlying odds conditioning on observing such a
posterior odds, the left hand side of (2). We are now ready
for some real stopping rules.
3.2 Stopping Rule Based on Bayes Factor
If rejecting H0 when observing a posterior odds no less
than K exposes us to a risk of false discovery at most 1/(1+
K), a natural stopping rule is to prescribe a false discovery
rate (FDR) bound and stop the test immediately if observed
posterior odds already can guarantee the FDR control. We
can setK = 9 to guarantee a FDR bound of 10% = 1/(9+1).
Similarly, we can early stop for futility and accept H0 if
we believe posterior of null is sufficiently large. A symmetric
design is to stop if posterior odds is either no less than K
or no greater than 1/K.
Figure 2 illustrated both stopping rules under the same
setup in fixed horizon case of Section 3.1, except for we are
stopping at the first t ≤ N when stopping rule is satisfied. In
each of the 100, 000 simulation runs, regardless of whether
this run is early stopped or stopped in the end, we always
calculate Bayes Factor based on Equation 3, replacing N
by the observed stopping time τ . Comparing Figure 2 to
Figure 1 shows big differences. The biggest one being the
spike at the stopping Bayes Factor boundaryK = 9 (and 1/9
for futility). However, the interesting observation is, despite
the huge histogram shift for both H1(red) and H0(green),
those numbers on the top margin — ratios of observed Bayes
Factors in each bin from H1 to H0, remains very close to the
theoretical Bayes Factor value calculated from Equation 3,
as in a fixed horizon test. This is exactly what Theorem 1
claims, and this simulation study confirms it!
For many who are used to the frequentist thinking of con-
trolling Type-I error, this result seems odd. If we allow early
stop, and still using the same rejection criteria of BF > 1/K,
we will only reject more so we will be inflating the Type-I
error. This is correct, but nonetheless does not conflict with
the fact that FDR is still controlled below the designed level.
Table 1: Impact of Early Stopping
Early Stop Rate
Type-I Power FDR H1 H0
Fixed Horizon 0.018 0.465 0.037 NA NA
One-sided Stop 0.060 0.599 0.09 59.5% NA
Two-sided Stop 0.060 0.598 0.09 64.9% 65.0%
Figure 2: Histograms of simulated Bayes Factor with
optional stopping. Top plot: one-sided stopping.
Bottom plot: two-sided stopping.
Table 1 shows the comparison of three simulation stud-
ies we did so far in terms of Type-I error, power and FDR.
In the fixed horizon design, when we reject for BF>9, the
Type-I error (proportion of false rejection among the null
cases) is 0.018. This value increased to 0.06 when continuous
monitoring/optional stopping is introduced. Because we are
rejecting more, the power of the test is also improved from
0.465 to 0.599. (Power in two-sided test is 0.598, slightly
smaller than in the one-sided test. We leave it to user to fig-
ure out why.) FDR in the finite horizon cases is only 0.037,
smaller than the designed bound of 0.1. This is because in
the finite horizon cases a lot of rejected cases at the end
of the test are actually bearing a BF much larger than the
threshold 9, see Figure 1. This suggests that in finite horizon
test, using a BF cutoff to calculate FDR might be conserva-
tive, also see Efron [9] for the differences of local FDR and
FDR. When optional stopping is introduced, FDR become
0.09, very close to the designed level. The small discrepan-
cies here is due to over-shoot, i.e. we stop once BF is larger
than 9 but not exactly at 9. These over-shoots are reflected
in Figure 2 where we found a few bars beyond the spike.
In large sample scenario where each individual observation
won’t make a big change in BF, as in most A/B tests, we
can think of the time series of BFt as continuous. In this
case we can stop the test with a BF almost exactly equal
to 9, and the FDR will be also almost exactly 0.1. We saw
that FDR control in the fixed horizon setting is conserva-
tive because we are wasting sample sizes to collect evidence
beyond what we really need, and with early stopping the
waste is mitigated. The last two columns in Table 1 shows
the percentage of the simulated experiment with early stop-
ping. We saw majority of the simulated runs stopped earlier.
We also calculated that the average length of the simulated
runs with early stopping is about 55, much smaller than the
fixed horizon of N = 100. Based on Table 1, one could argue
that early stopping is always superior than the fixed horizon
test, and should be recommended. More discussions are in
Section 6.
3.3 General Stopping Rule
Theorem 1 holdes for general stopping rules, not only
those based on BF cutoff values. For experimenters who
want to “hack” p-values, they could choose to stop once p-
value is less than α. Here we did the simulation study with
the stopping rule with both criteria: 1) p-value less than 0.1,
and 2) the sample sizes is at least 10.
Figure 3: Using a stopping rule based on p-value
and minimum required sample size.
Figure 3 shows the simulation results, this time with a
rather bizarre histogram for H1 runs. The important part
is the observed actual ratio on the top margin still closely
tracks the theoretical Bayes Factor values on the x-axis.
3.4 Composite Alternative
So far in this section we have been using a overly simple al-
ternative model H1 where the treatment effect is assumed to
be known. This is not very realistic since we never know the
effect so that alternative is always a composite alternative
where δ can be anything nonzero. In Bayesian model com-
parison we need to put a prior distribution for δ under H1,
in addition to the prior odds. Following [12] and [8], we put
a normal prior N(0, σ20)). Under this H1, Xi ∼ N(0, σ20 + 1)
and the formula for Bayes Factor assuming a fixed sample
size N changes to
N(X; 0, σ20 + 1/N)
N(X; 0, 1/N)
(4)
A similar simulation to those above in this section is run
by setting N = 1, 000. We also set σ0 = 0.1 to generate
50, 000 independent δ first for each of the simulation runs
fromH1. At the end of each runs(or at the stopping time) we
compute Bayes Factor based on (4) with N for fixed horizon
setting or τ in its place when optional stopping is introduced.
Figure 4 shows the results for both fixed horizon setting
and optional stopping with BF cutoff at 9. In the fixed
horizon setting, the histogram is much more dispersed than
the previous precise alternative case. Some BF is as large
as several thousands so we only show those no greater than
100. Early stopping effectively eliminated those extremely
large BF, creating spikes around 9. We hope readers at this
point already noticed that the top margin numbers are very
close to the theoretical BF values on the x-axis.
Figure 4: Composite H1 with Normal prior. Top:
fixed horizon(x-axis limit to 100). Bottom: early
stopping when BF>9.
4. PROOF OF MAIN THEOREM
We now prove Theorem 1. Readers who only need intu-
ition are recommended to skip the proof and jump to Sec-
tion 4.1. Both sides of the (2) are random variables depend-
ing on PostOddsτ . It is equivalent to the following:
P (H1|PostOddsτ = K)
P (H0|PostOddsτ = K) =
P (H1 and PostOddsτ = K)
P (H0 and PostOddsτ = K)
=
P (PostOddsτ = K|H1)
P (PostOddsτ = K|H0) ×
P (H1)
P (H0)
= K,
for any K where P (PostOddsτ = K) > 0. Let K
′ = K ×
P (H0)/P (H1). The event {PostOddsτ = K} is equivalent
to {BFτ = K′}. The last equality above after rearranging
the prior odds P (H1)/P (H0) to the right side becomes
P (BFτ = K
′|H1)
P (BFτ = K′|H0) = K
′. (5)
Without loss of generality, we only need to prove (5).
We first prove for the fixed horizon case, which is a di-
rect result of likelihood ratio identity, or change of measure.
For any fixed t, let Qt = P (·|H1) and Pt = P (·|H0) be the
probability measure under H1 and H0 respectively for ob-
servations up to t, both have a density function w.r.t. to
Lebesgue measure on the real line. Let A be any event ob-
servable at time t.4 The likelihood ratio identity5 ensures
Qt(A) = EPt
(
1A × dQt
dPt
)
,
where dQt/dPt is the likelihood ratio and 1A is the binary
indicator function for eventA. Recall Bayes Factor is defined
as the likelihood ratio. Replace dQt/dPt by BFt, set A =
{BFt = K′} in the above to get
Qt(BFt = K′) = EPt(1A)×K′ = K′ × Pt(BFt = K′),
(6)
which is (5).
We can generalize this argument for random time τ . The-
orem 1 requires τ to be a stopping time6 so that the event
{τ = t} is observable at time t. This is a necessary re-
quirement to ensure that we can apply the likelihood ratio
identity for the event {BFt = K′ and τ = t}(observable at
t) to get
Qt(BFt = K′, τ = t) = K′ × Pt(BFt = K′, τ = t). (7)
If τ can only take value from 1 to a maximum horizon N
(experiment stop at N no matter what, which covers all
practical cases), summing up (7) over all t entails
P (BFτ = K
′|H1) =
N∑
t=1
P (BFτ = K
′, τ = t|H1)
=
N∑
t=1
Qt(BFt = K′, τ = t) =
N∑
t=1
K′Pt(BFt = K′, τ = t)
=
N∑
t=1
K′P (BFτ = K
′, τ = t|H0) = K′P (BFτ = K′|H0)
which is (5) and the proof is completed. Notice how we
changed BFτ = K
′ to BFt = K′ once we restrict ourselves
to the set τ = t in the second and fifth equality. The essence
of the proof is to show
P (BFτ = K
′, τ = t|H1)
P (BFτ = K′, τ = t|H0) = K
′ (8)
4A ∈ Ft where Ft represents the set of measurable events
at time t. Ft is called a filtration because Fs ⊆ Ft for any
s ≤ t.
5It is also called change of measure identity because the
equation transforms an expectation under a measure P into
an expectation under another measure Q. This is a special
case of the Radon-Nykodym Theorem in measure theory.
6τ is a stopping time w.r.t. to a filtration Ft if {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft.
for every t ≤ N by applying likelihood ratio identity (7) and
then sum up both numerator and denominator of (8) over t
to recover (5). For potentially unbounded τ , we just need to
sum up to infinity and the result still holds because the sum
series of both numerator and denominator of (8) are finite.
Important Remark. We make the remark that Theo-
rem 1 does not require observation X to be sequential i.i.d.
observations as in earlier simulation examples. All we used
in the proof is the likelihood ratio identity for the whole path
of observations Xt up to t for any t. In a typical A/B test
with user level tracking, users who visit the site multiple
times will provide multiple observations sequentially. Since
there is a strong between-user correlation, when we look at
Xt, which includes all sequential observations (page-views)
from different users, they are not independent. However, at
any given time t, we can always first aggregate Xt to the
randomization unit, which is user. Take the metric Rev-
enue per user as example, Xt is the sequence of revenues
for each page-view up to time t. For each user, we can
sum up revenues as Yit, i = 1, . . . , Nt where Nt is number
of unique users. We can treat Yit as i.i.d. when comput-
ing likelihoods under both H1 and H0. For ratio metrics
such as Click-Through-Rate(CTR), Yit can either be CTR
for each user and average of Yit is the average CTR over
all users — a double average metric, or Yit can be a pair
(Clicksit, PageV iewsit) and the metric is the sum of clicks
over all users divided by sum of page-views. Delta Method
is required to compute the likelihood for the latter case. The
main point is that the original sequential observations might
not be i.i.d. but after aggregated to randomization unit
level, likelihood ratio can be easily calculated using those
aggregated values which can be assumed i.i.d. because of
the randomization design.
4.1 Intuitive Explanation
There is an intuitive explanation of Theorem 1 using the
same simulation procedure in Section 3 as a thought exper-
iment. Again we assume prior odds is 1:1 so Posterior Odds
equals to the Bayes Factor and (2) becomes (5).
We simulate M paths from H1 and H0. M is a very large
number, almost infinite. So every path simulated from H1
which has nonzero probability under H0 will have the same
path simulated under H0, and vice versa. For each path
we simulate the whole path X up to the fixed final hori-
zon N . For any t ≤ N and any path X, we can calculate
a Bayes Factor at time t to be BF (Xt) as likelihood ratio
P (Xt|H1)/P (Xt|H0). No stopping rule has been introduced
yet so everything so far belongs to the fixed horizon case.
Define Path(Xt|Hi), i = 0, 1 to be the set of all paths sim-
ulated from Hi, i = 0, 1 having the same subpath Xt up to
time t, and let |Path(·)| denote the total number of paths in
a path set, i.e. cardinality. Then for any t and any path X
with subpath Xt, |Path(Xt|H1)|/|Path(Xt|H0)| = BF (Xt).
Intuitively, this means for every subpath Xt simulated from
H0, there are on average BF (Xt) exaxt subpaths simulated
from H1. Because this statement is true for any subpath. If
we only look at subpaths such that BF (Xt) = K, we have
|Path({Xt : BF (Xt) = K}|H1)|/|Path({Xt : BF (Xt) =
K}|H0)| = K, for any K.
Now we introduce stopping rule. Pick any path X sim-
ulated from H0, say the stopping rule will stop at time t
and we computed the Bayes Factor to be K. The previous
argument shows there will be on average K number of the
the same exact subpath simulated from H1. Here comes the
important part! Because the stopping rule does not depend
on observations after the stopping time, all subpaths simu-
lated having the exact same subpath Xt up to t will also have
the exact same stopping time at t! (See the next section for
examples of bad stopping rules where this property is not
true, hence Theorem 1 does not apply.) After we gathered
all paths simulated from H0 with the same Bayes Factor K
at time t which also stopped at time t according to the stop-
ping rule, for each one of them we can find K exact same
subpaths which also stopped at time t. By one more step of
gathering all such set of paths for every possible t ≤ N , it
is then intuitively clear that the number of paths gathered
together from H1 and H0 have a ratio of exactly K. This is
exactly what we tried to demonstrate via various simulations
in Section 3.
5. BAD PRACTICES
Theorem 1 is a general result with very mild assumptions
which are satisfied in most cases. But failure of satisfying
those assumptions can result invalid test results. We list
three bad practices so readers can be aware of the limita-
tions of the result in this paper. One critical assumption is
that the stopping rule is properly defined that only uses in-
formation already observed, without peeking into the future.
One example for an improper stopping rule is to reassess all
the observations at some time t′, and then decide to only
use the data up to an earlier time t < t′, e.g. stop at t after
seeing data at a later time t′. This practice is called data
snooping and is not supported by Theorem 1. There are two
common bad practices related to data snooping:
Example 2 (Re-analysis after Fail to Reject).
Finite horizon test at N failed to reject H0. The same data
is then reanalyzed using continuous monitoring as in Exam-
ple 1.
Example 3 (Optimal Stopping).
The basic setup is the same as in Example 1. This time we
first collect all the data up to finite horizon N . Then, we look
at our data and try to find the best check-point t so the test
result Rt is the most favorable. The difference between this
example and continuous monitoring is that for the latter the
decision of stopping the experiment is made without peeking
at the data in future.
In both examples above, if we collected all the data up to
horizon N and did the test, we should always report this test
result instead of re-analysing the data or try to cherry pick
the optimal stopping time. This is because Bayesian test is
consistent: as we observe more data, posterior P (H1|Data)
converges to 1 if H1 is true and to 0 otherwise. This means
we should always prefer the decision made from more data.
However, it is possible that continuous monitoring might
have rejected H1 (if it were used) but the finite horizon
test at N does not. Does that mean continuous monitoring
makes more error? No! Table 1 shows continuous moni-
toring does increase the amount of null rejection, without
sacrificing the false discovery rate. In the above case the
posterior odds realized in the end of the experiment at hori-
zon N shows H1 is unlikely to be true. It is fair to say if
we had been using continuous monitoring, we would likely be
making a false discovery at that time, based on newer obser-
vations. However, let K′ be the posterior odds reported by
continuous monitoring, Theorem 1 guarantees that it is K′
to 1 odds that we will see posterior odds increasing to ∞ if
we keep getting more data, than decreasing to 0. In other
words, it is K′−1 more likely our decision still uphold in the
end of the experiment, than reversed as in the hypothetical
case.
Another critical assumption in Theorem 1 is that the like-
lihood ratio has to be correctly calculated with all available
observations, i.e. the whole subpath Xt. In particular, we
cannot cherry pick only those observations that favors one
hypothesis. Here is another bad example which happens a
lot in practice.
Example 4 (Continuous Testing until Win).
With agile development and continuous A/B testing, a team
can iteratively modifying and testing a feature until seeing a
successful test result.
In NHST, even if the feature has no effect, there is still
α(typically 0.05) chance that the result could be statistically
significant. This means for every 20 iterations, we might just
declare a success without really having any true effect. This
is like continuous monitoring, but the difference is that here
each new test only uses its own data. Using Bayesian test, if
we need to calculate the likelihood ratio up to the t-th test,
we have to aggregate all the evidence together, not just look-
ing at the last one. If all tests are independent replications
of the same test, aggregating evidence in Bayes test is triv-
ial, we just need to multiply likelihood ratio for each of the
replications all together. This way even if we might have a
few large likelihood ratio favoringH1, but ifH0 is the ground
truth there have to be more smaller likelihood ratios so the
product is small. In fact it will converge to 0 if we keep
doing replication runs. In practice, since iteration runs are
not exactly replications, it is still a challenge how we should
properly aggregate evidence from multiple experiment runs
together. Ignoring the prior runs can still result in more
false discovery than nominally controlled. Technically this
is the area of multiple testing and selection bias. See Lu and
Deng [20] for some preliminary results.
6. COMPARE TO FREQUENTIST METH-
ODS
6.1 NHST
We compare Bayes testing to NHST in this section to
reveal why continuous monitoring is an issue for NHST but
not for Bayes testing. For simplicity, we assume Xi, i =
1, . . . are sequential i.i.d. observations from N(µ, 1).
First we test H0 : µ = 0 against H1 : µ = δ. In NHST
we reject H0 when the z-statistics is larger than a constant
threshold, while in Bayes testing we reject when the Bayes
Factor (3) is larger than a constant threshold. Simplifying
both rejection boundary resulted in
|√nXn| > C1 NHST, (9)
|√nXn| > C2
√
n+ C3/
√
n Bayesian, (10)
where Ci, i = 1, 2, 3 are constants. Asymptotically, NHST
reject when test statistics is larger than O(1) and the Bayes-
ian test’s rejection boundary is O(
√
n). Why O(
√
n)? The
reason of having a O(
√
n) in this case is due to the fact that
we put a precise alternative µ = δ for H1. If H1 is true,
by central limit theorem, we would expect most of times we
should observe X within 1/
√
n neighborhood of δ. If H0
is true, then X should be within 1/
√
n neighborhood of 0.
In NHST, we only assess the likelihood of H0, so we reject
if X is outside of 1/
√
n neighborhood of 0. Bayesian test-
ing is symmetric, i.e., we compare the likelihood of H1 vs
H0. In this case since both hypothesis expect observation to
be within their 1/
√
n neighborhood, the “classification” line
should naturally be for X at the midway δ/2, which means
δ/2×√n for z-statistics.
Is a rejection boundary of O(
√
n) means Bayesian test will
be much less sensitive than NHST? Not necessarily. First
of all, if H1 is indeed true and Xi will have mean δ, then
the chance that we observe X within
√
n neighborhood of
δ is high, meaning it should not be too much problem for
the z-statistics to breach the O(
√
n) boundary. Secondly,
if we replace the precise alternative to a composite alter-
native with a normal prior N(0, V 2) on µ under H1, simi-
lar calculation reveals an asymptotic rejection boundary of
O(
√
log(n)), very close and almost can be considered O(1)
in practice7.
But why not simplyO(1)? Law of iterative logarithm(LIL)
shows in the i.i.d. sequential Xi case
√
n|X| even under
H0 will breach the boundary C
√
log(log(n)) infinitely of-
ten for any C. Any rejection boundary that is not at least
O
(√
log(log(n))
)
will be breached with probability 1 un-
der H0, and with Type-I error 1 with continuous monitoring,
when n→∞. If Bayesian test have a rejection boundary not
bigger than O
(√
log(log(n))
)
, it will reject H0 every time,
and the false discovery rate is solely determined by the prior
odds. This is in contradiction to the result of this paper. In
other words, because of Theorem 1, any valid Bayes test will
have a rejection boundary larger than O
(√
log(log(n))
)
.
In practice, it is true that Bayesian tests are in general
more conservative than NHST. Partly it is because the re-
jection boundary need to be at least O
(√
log(log(n))
)
—a
price to pay for continuous monitoring. Another more im-
portant part is because Prior Odds P (H1)/P (H0) usually
favors H0, and sometimes a lot, e.g. knowing certain metric
rarely truly moved.
6.2 Sequential Test
Since fixed horizon NHST does not control Type-I error
well, corrections have to be made under frequentist frame-
work to keep controlling Type-I error at desired level. Wald
[25] first introduced sequential probability ratio test (SPRT).
When assuming both H0 and H1 are precise, e.g. simple al-
ternative, SPRT make decision based on the likelihood ratio
P (Data|H1)/P (Data|H0) and reject H0 when LR > B and
accept H0 when LR < A. The bounds A and B can be
chosen such that Type-I error and Type-II error can be con-
trolled at desired levels. In practice we usually don’t know
the exact treatment effect under the alternative H1. Lai [19]
extended the idea of generalized likelihood ratio test into se-
quential setting. Johari et al. [12] introduced the notion of
“always valid inference”, where they used a variant of Wald’s
SPRT with a normal distribution on H1. It is called mSPRT
(m stands for mixture). From a Bayesian test perspective,
this is equivalent to putting a normal prior for the aver-
age effect size µ under H1, same as in Section 3.4, also see
7Sample size in practice are typically restricted to 1% of all
traffic to 100%, only an order of magnitude of 2.
Appendix B. However, despite the similarity in the form of
likelihood ratio there are two main differences:
1. mSPRT does not take prior knowledge into account,
while Bayesian test encode these information as prior
odds P (H1)/P (H0). We know from experience, and
from historical that some metrics are easier to move
than the others. For mSPRT the rejection boundary
for all metrics are the same. In A/B testing, it is re-
ported that most ideas fail to deliver desired move-
ment, or even move the success metric. Prior odds
P (H1)/P (H0) for most metrics are less than 20%.
2. A more fundamental difference is the interpretation
of the results. mSPRT controls Type-I error — the
chance of false rejection when H0 is true, while Bay-
esian test controls False Discovery rate (FDR) — the
chance of false rejection when decided to reject H0.
There is no simple relation ship between the two. When
we reject more aggressively, Type-I error will increase,
but FDR does not necessarily increase, as long as more
aggressive rejection will also reject more true positives.
FDR also extends to multiple testing cases easier than
Type-I error8. Johari et al. [12] also proposed a way to
generalize the classic Benjamini-Hochberg procedure
[2] to sequential setting to control FDR of mSPRT
tests in multiple testing scenario. This additional step
is not necessary in Bayesian test.
For both mSPRT and Bayesian test with normal alternative
model under H1, the asymptotic rejection boundary for test
statistics are both O
(√
log(n)
)
. Both methods makes the
same assumption about the normal alternative model. Bay-
esian test makes extra assumption that prior odds are also
known. To use either method, we strongly suggest learning
parameters from empirical data, as explained in appendix,
see Deng [8] for more detail.
7. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION
With Theorem 1 rigorously proved, we believe the debate
over whether continuous monitoring is a valid practice when
Bayesian Hypothesis Testing is used should be settled. The
answer is unequivocally yes, in the sense that the Bayesian
posterior remains unbiased (2) when a proper stopping rule
is used. We emphasize that the correct understanding of (2)
and interpretation of Bayesian test result as controlling FDR
is critical. Many researchers, even some versed in Bayesian
statistics [17], made the mistake of evaluating Bayesian test
results conditioning on either null is true or alternative is
true. The correct Bayesian interpretation always requires a
prior odds weighing the alternative and the null. Our simu-
lation illustrations in Section 3 serve the very goal of helping
readers understand this crucial point in a non-technical way.
Two natural questions are then raised by practitioners.
1) Because the fundamental difference in the statistical con-
clusions we can make from NHST and Bayesian test, which
one shall we use in practice? 2) Is the result of this paper
telling us when we use Bayesian test we should always use
continuous monitoring?
8FDR was originally brought up in frequentist multiple test-
ing scenario. FDR does not make much sense in frequentist
framework for single test because H0 for a test is assumed
to be either true or false. FDR is 1 if H0 is true and 0 other-
wise. There is no room in the middle with prior probability.
For the first question, we focus on the difference of con-
trolling Type-I error and FDR. If false rejection of any single
test cost us a lot, and the cost of false rejection is consid-
ered higher than false negative(fail to reject true H1), then
Type-I error seems to be a better criterion to control. A
good example for this case is clinical trial. If our goal is not
focus on each individual test, but the overall performance
of our decision on a large set of tests, and the cost of false
rejection and false negative are in the same order, then we
believe FDR is a better criterion. Large scale A/B testing
platform is an example of the latter [15]. In an agile envi-
ronment, where success are built upon a lot of small gains,
as long as we are shipping more good features really meet
customer needs than useless ones, we are moving in the right
direction.
For the second question, continuous monitoring is not al-
ways recommended. In many cases, the goal of the experi-
ment is not only to confirm the existence of the treatment
effect, but also to measure it. In A/B tests, it is not uncom-
mon for a feature to have time-varying treatment effect such
as weekday and weekend differences. To capture the weekly
cycle, running tests for a whole week or multiple of weeks
are often recommended. It is also possible that the treat-
ment effect only exists in the weekend and we might early
stop the experiment during the first few weekdays when we
use continuous monitoring with an early acceptance of H0.
But continuous monitoring should be recommended in many
other scenarios. Shutdown a bad experiment is one appli-
cation. We want to shutdown an experiment once we have
enough evidence that the treatment is giving user a very bad
experience. Another example is comparing a few closely re-
lated alternative candidates, e.g. tuning parameters for a
backend algorithm, in which case we might assume the or-
dering of the treatment effects won’t be time-varying and
hence we can early stop inferior candidates and ramping
up outperforming candidates based on Bayesian posterior.
The last example is studied in more detail in the literature
of multi-armed bandit and Thompson sampling [5] and the
result of this paper justifies Thompson sampling for using
Bayesian posterior to dynamically change data gathering.
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APPENDIX
A. TWO SAMPLE TEST AS ONE SAMPLE
TEST
We review two sample t-test and its large sample z-test
version. We also show how to “normalize” the scale and turn
the two sample test into an equivalent one sample test. This
transformation also introduce the notions of effect size and
effective sample size which is important in Bayesian test.
Suppose observations for treatment and control groups
are i.i.d. from two distributions with unknown mean τT
and τC respectively. Denote our observations by Yi, i =
1, . . . , NT andXi, i = 1, . . . , NC . We test the null hypothesis
H0 : τT − τC = 0 against the alternative H1 : τT 6= τC .
Without assuming distributions of X and Y , we use the
central limit theorem and hence use Wald test which is large
sample version of the well-known t-test. The test statistic is
Z :=
X − Y√
σ2T /NT + σ
2
C/NC
=
∆√
σ2T /NT + σ
2
C/NC
,
where σC and σT are variances of X and Y . The variances
are also unknown but in large sample scenario we assume
they are known and use their estimates. Note that metrics
are often in different scales. We first define NE = 1/(1/NT +
1/NC) to be the effective sample size. And then let σ
2 be
the pooled variance such that σ2/NE = σ
2
T /NT +σ
2
C/NC .
With δ = ∆/σ, Z-statistics can be rewritten as
Z =
δ√
σ2/NE
. (11)
δ is ∆ scaled by pooled standard deviation and is called the
effect size. Finally, define
µ := E(δ) = E(∆)/σ = (τT − τC)/σ (12)
is the average treatment effect scaled by σ. When σ is
known, inference on τT − τC and µ are equivalent. In Bay-
esian analysis it is common to define prior for µ as it is
scaleless.
B. OBJECTIVE PRIOR LEARNING
Recall µ is the average effect size. Under H0, µ = 0.
Under H1, we assume a prior pi for µ. For both cases we
observe δ ∼ N(µ, 1/NE). In addition, we assume a prior
probability p for H1 being true, and also under H1, pi ∼
N(0, V 2) for some V . Our challenge is to learn both p and
V without the need of subjectively assigning one.
Here we take advantages of historical experiment results
and use them to learn the prior. Suppose for a given metric,
we have N previously conducted tests with observed effect
size and effective sample size (δi, NEi), i = 1, . . . , N . We
have no idea which of those are from H0 or H1. Fitting the
model to find MLE isn’t straightforward, due to the fact that
we don’t know each δi belongs to H0 or H1. Fortunately,
a solution for this type of hidden latent variable problem,
called Expectation-Maximization, is well-known[7]. EM al-
gorithm in our case reduces to a fairly intuitive form as the
following.
Step I. If p and V are known, the posterior odds for each δi
belonging to H1 against H0 have the simple form
φ(δi; 0, 1/NEi + V
2)
φ(δi; 0, 1/NEi)
× p
1− p (13)
where φ(x;µ, σ2) is the normal density with mean µ and
variance σ2. Convert posterior odds to Pi := P (H1|δi; p, V ).
Step II. Set p to be P (H1|δ; p, V ) by taking average of all Pi
calculated in Step I.
Step III. To update V , note that under H1, V ar(δi) =
E(δ2i ) = V
2 + E(1/NEi). Although we don’t know abso-
lutely whether a δi belongs to H1, we can use posterior Pi
in Step II as weights:
V 2 = WAvg(δ2i ;Pi)−WAvg(1/NEi;Pi) (14)
where WAvg(xi;wi) =
∑
wixi/
∑
wi. To avoid numerical
issue that V 2 in (14) can take negative value, we bound V 2
away from 0 by a lower bound.
The EM algorithm starts with an initial value of p and V ,
iterates through the 3 steps above until they converge. Step I
is the E-step. Step II and Step III are the M-step updating
p and V .(Technically Step III is generalized M-step. We
update V using method of moment estimator knowing with
high probability it increase the expected log-likelihood.)
The lower bound in Step III is not purely a numerical
trick. It is needed for model identification. When V = 0,
µ ≡ 0 under both H1 and H0. We cannot distinguish H1
and H0, leading to an unidentifiable model. We recommend
setting the lower bound V 2 = k2 ×Avg(1/NE) and set k to
2, see [8] for explanation.
